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ABSTRACT:

This chapter presents an overview of the theoretical law and

economics literature on the burden of proof within tort law. I begin by clarifying
core legal definitions within this topic, demonstrating that the burden of proof
actually refers to at least five doctrinal concepts that substantially overlap but are
not completely interchangeable.

I then provide a conceptual roadmap for

analyzing the major extant contributions to this topic within theoretical law and
economics, emphasizing three key dimensions that organize them: (a) where they
fall in the positive-normative spectrum; (b) what type of underlying modeling
framework they employ (ranging from decision theoretic to game theoretic to
mechanism design); and (c) whether they focus on litigation activity or primary
activities (or both). In the aggregate, the resulting theoretical landscape is a
complex one, yielding a number of interesting insights. Yet it still suffers from
having no single unified theory.

I conclude by offering a number of

recommendations about where applied law and economics scholars interested this
topic could direct their research efforts.
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1. Introduction
Since nearly its very inception, law and economics (L&E) scholarship has contributed
important and valuable insights about how “substantive” legal rules in general—and tort law in
particular—can affect behavior and economic welfare. Like other vehicles of regulation and
taxes, the contours of tort law (such as negligence standards, affirmative defenses, damages
measurement, and the like) directly distort individual incentives, risk allocations, activity levels,
cost realizations and wealth/income distributions. The collective observations of L&E scholars
about the efficiency attributes of tort law are real and rich, and they have informed legal policymaking and reform efforts for much of the last half century.
That said, arguably a more distinct contribution of L&E scholarship on torts may lie not
with its considerable insights about substantive law (an analytic approach common to much of
welfare economics), but rather with its (arguably) less heralded insights about the procedural
rules through which law operates. Unlike conventional mechanisms of public policy, the legal
system embodies an idiosyncratic set of traditional (and highly cherished) rules and processes—
many of which themselves introduce special forms of incentives, risks, and strategic behavior
among litigants and other stakeholders. Consequently, the application of legal process through
courts (and other quasi-judicial actors) bears a heavy hand in mediating both the delivery and
consequential impact of substantive law.
It is therefore hardly surprising that the last four decades have spawned a rich subliterature in L&E centering on how the legal process itself—including the rules, protocols and
traditions to which it subscribes—operates to alter outcomes of litigation, and in so doing
incentives and allocations in ways that could either promote or frustrate the operation and policy
goals of substantive law. Any efficiency-minded legal reformer advocating prescriptive reform
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to substantive legal rules who ignores the procedural implementation of such reforms does so at
her peril.
Within the broad array of topics germane to the legal process, there is probably none so
central as the allocation of the (so-called) “Burden of Proof” (BoP) in litigation. Although it
may appear upon first blush to bear the marker of a “mere” procedural formality, the BoP is far
from it. To the contrary, the BoP embodies the very decision-making structure that animates and
defines legal order itself. Indeed, as most judges and practitioners are fond of observing, in
many practical instances these seeming procedural formalities often substantially determine the
outcome of a case.
This criticality of process in general—and the BoP in particular—may be especially
salient in cases where the economic stakes are high, and where the informational environment is
complex, opaque, and difficult to navigate. In such situations, it is plausible that no single
entity—not the jury, not the judge, not attorneys, not the parties themselves—has full and
complete command of all the “facts” pertinent to a legal dispute. It is here where the burden
allocation may be the most influential in catalyzing information discovery, reducing verification
costs, and ultimately contributing to overall welfare policy goals.
This chapter reviews the conceptual nature of the BoP, and organizes and catalogues the
L&E contributions to this literature, assessing how law and economics scholarship has both
sharpened and complicated our understanding of how evidentiary burdens plausibly operate in
practice, how they should operate, and how economic welfare-minded policy-makers can
incorporate such insights into practical prescriptive reforms. 2 In the end, I conclude that the
literature on BoP has spawned a large number of interesting and durable insights about how
2

In the balance of this chapter, I will tend to use the term “economic welfare” rather than “efficiency” under the
premise that the former is a more general term, capable of incorporating (for example) distributive desiderata as well
as conventional efficiency-oriented aims.
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substantive and procedural law interact with one another. At yet, at the same time, the range of
methodologies and objectives reflected in this literature is still so broad as to elude easy
categorization or simple prescriptive sound bites. Consequently, I conjecture, the L&E literature
on the burden of proof is likely to make significant contributions to practical legal policy only
when L&E scholars are better able to unify, test and, for want of a better term, “market” its
insights to practitioners.
One caveat deserves explicit mention before proceeding. My focus in this essay will
predominantly center on theoretical models of the BoP within the relevant law and economics
literature (rather than empirical or experimental contributions).

This is in part because of

unavoidable space constraints, and in part because most of the significant contributions
heretofore have come through theory. It is likely that the next phases of inquiry will be more
evenly divided, however, between theory, empiricism, and experimentalism. Accordingly, at the
end of this essay when I chart a course for future research, my recommendations will tend to fall
along all three methodological dimensions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.

Section II provides a brief

conceptual overview of the core legal concepts that surround the burden of proof, and how they
are conceived of within traditional legal parlance. Here I illustrate that, far from being a
monolithic concept, the “burden” of proof is more akin to a composite of at least five
interlocking concepts. 3 The precise application and interaction of these concepts, however,
remain somewhat elusive notwithstanding an immense literature discussing and dissecting
them—a state of play that simultaneously confounds and invites economic analysis. Section III
turns to the economic analysis of the burden of proof, and catalogues major L&E contributions to

3

Those are: the burden of production, the burden of persuasion, evidentiary standards, and legal presumptions and
legal assumptions. I do not classify (nor do most other commentators) the “burden of pleading” as part of this group.
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the field along three different dimensions: (a) The normative/positive spectrum; (b) modeling
approaches employed; and (c) scope of inquiry. Section IV concludes, offering thoughts for
future work in the field.
2. Definitional Dark Matter
Before reviewing the law and economics literature on the topic, it is necessary first to
understand—or at least appreciate—the rough doctrinal contours of the burden of proof. This is
no mean feat: As recently as 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court described the BoP as “one of the ‘the
slipperiest members of the family of legal terms.’ ” Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship (2011);
Schaffer ex rel Schaffer v. Weast (2005).
The doctrinal slipperiness of the BoP has at least two important implications for
economic analysis. First, it presents a challenge for those who aspire to model the burden of
proof theoretically, and particularly those who wish to posit a model that comports (at least to
some extent) with existing legal practices.4 The task of such efforts clearly is made more difficult
by the lack of a consistent, precise verbal definition among many legal practitioners. Second, it
also presents something of a constructive opportunity for law and economics scholars, whose
efforts might provide insights into what a welfare-minded BoP should look like.

Such

contributions may be of significant assistance in helping scholars of torts, evidence and
procedure develop sharper and more precise definitions of the relevant terms.
In practice, 5 the term “burden of proof” bundles together at least five inter-related
phenomena, which scholars, practitioners and laypeople alike tend intermittently to reorganize,
redefine, contest and conflate.

The first—and most intuitive—phenomenon is commonly

4

As discussed below, the extent to which an economic / game theoretic model of legal process should “fit” extant
practices depends on the objectives of the scholarly enterprise.
5
The description in the text comes from the Model Code of Evidence’s definitions, but in some states—such as
California—the term “Burden of Proof” denotes what is more widely identified as the Burden of Persuasion.
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referred to the Burden of Persuasion.

This burden articulates how, once all evidence is

submitted, courts will weigh the offered evidence from either side, deciding remaining
uncertainties about contested claims.

The party charged with the burden of persuasion

legitimately carries a “burden,” because it is she who must present enough probative evidence to
convince the fact-finder that her case is sufficiently “strong” to warrant a verdict in her favor.6
Should the plaintiff fail in this regard, by implication, she has failed to satisfy her Burden of
Persuasion, and the other side prevails.7
As a default rule in most civil cases within Anglo-American courts, burden of persuading
the fact finder that liability is present generally rests with the plaintiff. Even without economic
analysis to justify it, this default allocation of the burden of persuasion makes great intuitive
sense as a litigation- and enforcement-cost saving device, since it is the plaintiff who (usually)
advocates a change from the status quo ante (at least before litigation).8 As a general matter, the
party bearing the burden of persuasion remains constant during litigation (though affirmative
defenses raise interesting analytic puzzles, as discussed below).
The second related term is the “Standard of Proof.” 9

This term specifies criteria for

applying the burden of persuasion. In other words, it specifies how far the party bearing the
burden of persuasion must push the judicial fact-finder’s assessment in order to prevail in her
legal claim. (See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, at n.4).

Borrowing on a Bayesian/Quasi-

Bayesian account (to which I return again in later sections),10 there are many different standards

6

In a canonical negligence claim in torts, this involves proving multiple elements, including the existence of a duty,
its breach by lack of due care, actual causation of injury, proximate causation of the injury, and resulting damages.
Whether the plaintiff must establish these elements one by one versus jointly is a topic I take up below.
7
The party bearing the burden of persuasion is sometimes said analytically to also bear the concomitant risk of nonpersuasion. See, e.g., Winter (1971).
8
Id.
9
This is sometimes referred to alternatively as the “evidence threshold” (Kaplow 2012).
10
The term “Bayesian” refers to the process by which a statistically-minded decision maker marshals available
information to update her probabilistic beliefs about the world. In the present context, the relevant decision maker is
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of proof in litigation, ranging—in ascending order—from “preponderance of evidence” common
in civil litigation (something akin to a 51% Bayesian confidence assessment), to “clear and
convincing evidence” (perhaps on the order of 70-80%), to “beyond a reasonable doubt”
common to criminal proceedings (perhaps on the order of 95% or more).
The third related term is the Burden of Production. This is a procedural rule identifying
which party is required to submit information or evidence about the case if she wishes to alter a
(possibly interim) legal conclusion in a she desires. At least initially, in most civil litigation
cases, the burden of production and the burden of persuasion both fall on the plaintiff.
Nevertheless, the Burden of Production differs from the Burden of Persuasion in at least
two important respects. First, unlike the Burden of Persuasion, which explicitly weighs
previously submitted evidence of one party against that of the other, the Burden of Production is
what regulates the (usually) sequential process by which those pieces of evidence are provided to
the fact-finder.

When a plaintiff bearing the Burden of Persuasion brings forth evidence

which—if wholly uncontroverted by the defendant—would satisfy the Standard of Proof, then
the plaintiff is frequently said to have made out a prima facie case, satisfying her burden of
production, and allowing the case to be decided by the fact-finder. However, that is not the end
of the case because the defendant now has the opportunity to refute the plaintiff’s evidence or

a judicial fact-finder (either jury or judge). The process of updating follows what is known as “Bayes' rule,” which
states (for the case of discrete random variables) that the probability of an event A occurring, conditional on
knowing that some other event B has occurred (or Pr[A|B]) can be derived from a combination of the respective
“base rate” probabilities of A and B (or Pr[A] and Pr[B]) and the “reverse conditional” probability that B occurs,
conditional on knowing that A has occurred (or Pr[B|A]). These four probabilities are related to one another
according to the following expression:
|
Pr |
.
For example, suppose that one were attempting to use the outcome of a diagnostic test to infer whether a medical
patient was carrying a deadly virus. And suppose further that when administered to people who are known to have
the virus, the test yields a positive result 50% of the time. Moreover, among the general population, the test yields a
positive result 25% of the time, and 10% of the general population carries the virus. Using Bayes' rule, it is possible
to calculate the probability that an individual who has tested positive also carries the virus is equal to 20%, twice the
unconditional base rate in the population (but still less than 50% likely that she has the disease).
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adduce contrary evidence of her own. Thus, while the Burden of Persuasion as to a particular
claim remains largely constant through litigation, the Burden of Production is sometimes said to
oscillate in contingent fashion as each side proffers its evidence.11
The second major difference is that unlike the Burden of Persuasion (where the ultimate
question of satisfying the burden is up to the fact-finder), the assignment and assessment of the
Burden of Production is solely the province of the judge. Failure of a plaintiff to adduce
evidence satisfying her initial Burden of Production, for example, can justify a dismissal or
directed verdict in the defendant’s favor without ever being put to a jury. A similar implication
frequently may work in the reverse direction, particularly when a defendant asserts affirmative
defense (such as claiming contributory negligence by the plaintiff in a torts case). As to this
affirmative defense, the defendant would bear (at least initially) the burdens of persuasion and
production. Should she fail to produce sufficient evidence to substantiate the defense, the judge
will instruct the jury to ignore it.
The final “nearby” definition concerns the overlapping terms of legal assumptions and
presumptions. These are perhaps the most slippery concepts in the field, and their precise
interpretations (and particularly that of presumptions) remain inconsistent and heavily contested. Under

the simplest definitions, assumptions and presumptions are respectively the default conditions –
and thus the analytic duals – for the burdens of persuasion and production. Assumptions fix
initial conditions in light of the Burden of Persuasion. In typical cases (civil and criminal), the
initial assumption is that the defendant is not liable, and the act of dislodging this assumption is
11

See, e.g., Wigmore (1940) §§ 2489; 2494. This “shifting” view of the burden of production is frequently
disputed among evidence scholars, with some viewing the burden of production as nothing more than a lower bound
for what evidentiary showing is necessary for the petitioning party’s case to go to the fact-finder. Accordingly,
under this account, should the petitioning party satisfy her burden of production, the “burden” does not shift, as
much as the non-petitioning side now bears a risk of liability if she does not endeavor to counter the petitioner’s
evidence. See, e.g., Wright et al. (2012) § 5122. Declaring the victor of this battle of the evidence-wonk bands is,
thankfully, beyond the scope of this chapter.
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coterminous with carrying one’s burden of persuasion (which, as noted above, remains fixed
through trial 12 ). Presumptions, in contrast, fix initial conditions in light of the Burden of
Production at various stages of trial, identifying which party must bear burden of going forward
with evidence. “Rebutting” a presumption is therefore equivalent under this view to satisfying
one’s burden of production as to a disputed issue. Thus, as with the Burden of Production,
presumptions are often said to shift back and forth as trial proceeds. 13
As should be obvious from this brief overview, there is a rich and longstanding debate
within evidence and civil procedure regarding the definition (and redefinition) of the elements
that collectively constitute the burden of proof. And with that debate is a significant literature on
the topic, which takes a number of different perspectives ranging from formalistic to historical to
expressive to positive to normative.14 The balance of this essay cannot do justice to the totality
of this literature, and thus concentrates solely on positive and policy-oriented approaches that
utilize economic analysis.
3. Law and Economics Analysis of the Burden of Proof
As noted above, the contested and sometimes elusive understanding of the Burden of
Proof in legal discourse presents both a challenge for law and economics scholars writing in the
field, as well as an opportunity for them (and others) to attempt to clarify the landscape. The last
four decades have borne witness to an interesting theoretical literature in law and economics on
the topic. Perhaps channeling the topic’s complex doctrinal landscape, L&E contributions in the

12

It is important to distinguish statement that the defendant is “assumed not liable” with the (stronger) Bayesian
assertion that one’s prior probability assessment of the defendant’s liability is zero. As described in greater detail
infra at n.24, the latter statement would produce a pathological result in which – because of an inflexible prior
probability assessment – no amount of evidence could ever be persuasive enough to lead to a finding of liability.
13
As noted above, the term “presumption” often is invoked to sweep in concepts even broader than what is stated in
the text. For example, the term is at times employed to describe the burden of persuasion in an affirmative defense,
or alternatively as tie-breaking decisional rules in cases where the evidence is unclear. See Allen (1981) for an
overview, as well as a critique of the highly elusive definition of presumption.
14
Stein (2005) provides an excellent overview.

10

field have similarly tended to be multifaceted and heterogeneous, undertaking distinct and
sometimes divergent approaches, depending on the goals of the research, the modeling decisions
of the researcher, and the nature of the inquiry. This section considers that heterogeneity along
three different dimensions: (1) the contribution’s place on positive/normative spectrum; (2) the
contribution’s theoretical modeling approach; and (3) the contribution’s place on the substantive
law/legal process spectrum.
A. The Normative/Positive Spectrum
Like many other endeavors in the economic analysis of law, most contributions can be
classified as either positive or normative. Positive contributions within this area tend to take the
existing BoP structures as given, analyzing how they shape various types of behavior (both
during litigation and before), as well as generating falsifiable predictions about how various
“shocks” or changes in BoP structures might alter that behavior. Normative contributions, in
contrast, tend to focus on desirable behavior (usually against a posited economic welfare
measure), and the consequent social desirability of the status quo against a host of potential
alternative institutional designs.
Each of the approaches described above comes entail advantages and disadvantages, as
well as different modeling desiderata.

Scholars interested in making purely (or primarily)

positive contributions tend to focus on models whose details correspond (at least loosely) with
the key institutional features of the BoP as articulated and practiced by courts. For example, all
else constant, a positive model would preferably capture the central characteristics of burdens of
persuasion and production, standards of proof, assumptions and presumptions as outlined in
Section 2. This makes perfect sense, since the goal of positive theory is to make predictions
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about how existing institutions operates, thereby placing a premium on fidelity to institutional
detail.
For those interested in making purely (or predominantly) normative contributions, in
contrast, institutional fidelity may be singularly unattractive, since it significantly constrains the
task of designing and implementing wholesale reform. Normative analyses, therefore, often tend
to eschew modeling frameworks that unduly fetishize prevailing practice at the expense of
prescriptive possibility. Indeed, a key strength of normative analysis is its ability to evaluate
longstanding institutional processes without assuming those traditions to be sacrosanct.15
Both pure positive and pure normative approaches also have weaknesses, however. Pure
positive analysis may be unsatisfying to reform minded readers, while pure normative
approaches may be too fanciful or abstract to implement in practice. Perhaps recognizing these
limitations, a third strand of the law and economics literature on burdens attempts (rather
successfully) to occupy a prominent middle ground. Such hybrid contributions, while seeking
ultimately to deliver normative policy prescriptions, are also practically oriented around
incremental improvements, suggesting tweaks to and reforms of existing institutional practices
rather than a wholesale reinvention of litigation systems. Consequently, theoretical contributions
within this tradition necessarily must balance incorporating some core institutional details from
evidence and civil procedure, leaving some degrees of freedom to consider the designs of central
“parameters” of that system. Because each approach described above may be appropriate in
certain situations, it should not be surprising that each—the purely positive, purely normative,
and hybridized—is now quite common within the law and economics literature on the BoP.

15

Sometimes the object may also be to rationalize current practices by demonstrating that they are “optimal” in an
economic welfare sense (or approximately so). But even here, to be convincing at rationalizing current practice, the
underlying model must be capable to generalize practices beyond the status quo ante.
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B. Modeling Frameworks for the BoP
A second significant dimension of heterogeneity in the law and economics literature on
the BoP concerns the general conceptual framework that scholars adopt to analyze its operation.
Although myriad variations exist, they most naturally fall into four distinct clusters: Decisiontheoretic analyses, Game-Theoretic frameworks, hybrid Game-Theoretic frameworks involving a
Bayesian Fact-finder; and Mechanism-Design approaches.
1. Decision Theoretic Frameworks
Perhaps the simplest and most intuitive branch of the L&E scholarship on burdens adopts
what one might call decision-theoretic perspective (Kaplan 1968; Easterbrook 1984; Hylton &
Salinger 2001). This approach trains exclusive (or near exclusive) focus on the decision problem
facing the finder of fact, weighing the previously-submitted evidence in a case. Under this
approach, the fact-finder’s role is tantamount to a welfare-minded social planner, using adduced
evidence to learn and make decisions within an information-constrained environment. The
evidence produced in a case enables an uncertain fact-finder to “update” her assessment of the
case (possibly in a Bayesian manner) in light of that evidence (Feess et al. 2009).
For example, suppose a court were attempting to assess whether a defendant had
exercised due care in an automobile accident, and that the substantive negligence standard was
triggered only if the defendant’s precautions, denoted as
negligence standard

∗

∈ 0, ∞ , fell below some articulated

0.16 This would, of course, be an easy task to accomplish if the fact-

finder could directly observe the driver’s precautions. The more interesting case occurs when
the driver’s precautions are not directly observable, so that the fact finder must resort to looking
towards observable “evidence” about v, such as the driver’s evident speed, whether his cell
phone was in use in the time leading up to the accident, his driving record, and the like.
16

For simplicity, assume that v is a scalar value. The analysis generalizes to vector-valued precautions.
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Accordingly, denote this observable evidence as

∈

, and suppose this evidence

provides noisy information about v. Formally, suppose that v and x are distributed according to a
prior density function f(v,x), with associated marginal densities of g(v) and h(x) for v and x,
respectively.17 Having observed evidence x, the fact-finder can update its assessment in any
number of ways. Perhaps the most intuitive updating process might be Bayes rule (e.g., Feess et
al. 2009), under which the fact-finder uses the evidence observed to generate a posterior
conditional probability density on the defendant’s actual behavior,

|

,

. (Note that so

long as v and x are not completely statistically independent of one another, the evidence
represented by x is statistically “probative,” so that this updated density will generally not
coincide with the marginal distribution on v, or g(v)).
The decision-maker could then utilize this information to assign liability according to the
underlying substantive rule, perhaps weighing the relative costs associated with false positives
(finding that the defendant was liable when in fact she met the negligence standard) and false
negatives (finding that the defendant was not liable when in fact she fell short of the standard).
For concreteness, suppose the decision maker cares about making “accurate” judgments, and that
she receives a payoff normalized to be 0 whenever she correctly finds that the defendant was
negligent (a “true positive”) or when she correctly finds the defendant was not negligent (a “true
negative”). On the other hand, the decision maker incurs a welfare loss of e1 whenever she
17

A density function, denoted f(y), is a standard way to express the probabilistic behavior of some continuously
distributed random variable y, whose realizations – unlike discrete random variables – do not fall into countable,
discrete outcomes. Because there are infinitely many realizations for a continuous random variable, the probability
of realizing any specific realization is effectively zero. Nevertheless, one can characterize the probability of the
outcome falling in some range [a,b]: This is simply the area under the density function between a and b. It is
common to express the area under the density function to the left of some prescribed cutoff b using a cumulative
distribution function, which is often denoted as F(b) =
. Consequently, the probability of the outcome
falling in range [a,b] could be expressed using this notation as F(b)-F(a). Perhaps the most well-known continuous
density function is the Gaussian, or so-called “normal” distribution of a variable with mean  and variance . The
density function for a normally distributed variable z is given by:
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√

.

incorrectly finds negligence when the defendant took due care (a “false positive”) and a loss of e2
whenever she incorrectly finds non-negligence when the defendant was actually negligent (a
“false negative”). If the decision maker finds negligence, her expected payoff is the probabilityweighted value of her “true positive” and “false positive” contingent payoffs:
∗|

Pr

∙0

∗|

Pr

∙

∗|

1

∙

(1)

where F(v*|z) denotes the cumulative distribution 18 associated with density function f(v|z)
evaluated at v=v*. If the decision maker finds no negligence, in contrast, her expected payoff is
the probability weighted value of her “true negative” and “false negative” payoffs:
Pr

∗|

0

∗|

Pr

∗|

∙

(2)

Combining expressions (1) and (2), it follows that a loss-minimizing decision maker will find
liability if and only if the odds ratio of negligence to non-negligence is greater than the ratio of
losses associated with Type 1 and Type 2 errors19:
Pr
Pr

|
|

≡

∗|

1

∗|

(3)

,

In the special case where the decision-maker places equal weight on Type 1 and Type 2
errors (e1 = e2), this condition simplifies down into requiring that the evidence be strong enough
to satisfy a more-likely-than-not condition:
Pr

|

Pr

|

(4)

Significantly, this condition corresponds to the description that commentators frequently identify
with the preponderance of the evidence standard. In contrast, when Type 1 errors are more
costly than Type 2 errors (e1 > e2), the evidentiary standard would weigh evidence differently
too. When false positives are three times as costly as false negatives, for example, this critical
18

See note 17, supra.
Recall the convention from probability theory that “Type 1” errors are false positives, and “Type 2” errors are
false negatives. (A “Type 3” error, in contrast, is the failure to keep straight which is which.)

19
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cutoff increases from 50% to 75% (something akin to a clear and convincing standard). When
false positives are nineteen times more costly, the critical cutoff increases further to 95%
(something akin to beyond reasonable doubt).
The above framework, moreover, is general enough to admit numerous generalizations.
For example, suppose the observed realizations of evidence x were systematically related to
underlying precaution levels v in an ordered fashion – that is, higher realizations of x predicted
higher values of v.20 In such settings, the condition in (3) would imply the existence of a “cutoff”
threshold for evidence -- say x* -- such that an evidentiary signal of x* or less would imply that
the burden of persuasion has been met, and the court should find negligence. Alternatively, one
might imagine expanding the dimensionality of the framework, allowing for one dimension to
capture the defendant’s precautions (and evidence about it), and another to capture the plaintiff’s
precautions (and evidence about it).

Such generalizations would also allow the decision-

theoretic framework to capture both causes of action and affirmative defenses.
A decision-theoretic account also lends itself to analyzing (and in some ways
complicating) the long-standing quandary about how to apply the BoP when the underlying
cause of action has multiple conjunctive elements. In both civil and criminal law settings, the
traditional (albeit sometimes controversial) requirement is that in order to prevail, the petitioning
party must prove “every element” of a legal claim by the applicable evidentiary standard.21 A
common impression is that the every-element requirement favors the defendant, raising the
degree of difficulty for the petitioning party to procure a victory. While this impression possibly
has merit, a decision-theoretic account can also complicate this understanding. Consider, for
example, a hypothetical cause of action that requires proof of two conjunctive elements, A and
20

Such might be the case, for example, if x constituted a “noisy” but unbiased observation of v, so that x = v + ,
where  denotes an error term with zero and a strictly positive variance (representing the observational noise).
21
See, e.g., In re Winship 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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B, and an applicable standard of proof consisting of a preponderance rule (i.e., a judicial
Bayesian posterior of strictly more than 50%).

Element
B

Present
Absent

Element A
Present
Absent





Table 1: Hypothetical Joint Posterior Probabilities of
Presence / Absence of Required Elements

Suppose that the available evidence were such that the fact-finder’s posterior assessment of the
presence/absence of Elements A and B were as shown in Table 1 above. Thus, the evidence
produced at trial suggests that the contingency where Element A is present but Element B is
absent (i.e., the southwest cell) occurs with probability , and similarly for all other
combinations, so that each entry in the table represents a value falling between zero and one, and
the cells collectively sum to 1.0 (or 100%).
One plausible interpretation of an every-element requirement is that the petitioning party
must prove each of (1) the presence of Element A in isolation by a preponderance (the left
column of the table), and also prove (2) the presence of Element B in isolation by a
preponderance (the top row).

Under this interpretation, from Table 1 above the plaintiff will

succeed if both Pr[A] =  > 0.5 = 50% and Pr[B] =  > 0.5 = 50%, a burden that is
equivalent to the condition that  + Min{} > 0.5.
Now consider the plaintiff’s task were she subject not to an element-by-element
requirement, but rather something else. One plausible “something else” would be that the
plaintiff must demonstrate the joint occurrence of Element A and Element B (or formally,

∩ )

by a preponderance of the evidence. Here, Table 1 suggests that this would be equivalent to
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showing Pr[ ∩ ] =  > 0.5, a condition that is more (not less) restrictive than the element-byelement test. In other words, relative to this alternative, an every-element test would make for a
smoother (not bumpier) road to a plaintiff’s victory (and a defendant’s loss).22
As the discussion above indicates, the decision-theoretic framework has a number of
ostensibly appealing characteristics. It is intuitive. It uses foundational concepts from probability
theory. It yields interpretations that tend to “fit” with at least some existing practices, and
particularly the Burden of Persuasion, Assumptions, and Standards of Proof. It can be used to
analyze and frame various types of positive and normative analysis about the BoP.23 And it is
capable of engaging with interesting current debates about evidentiary burdens.

For these

reasons, perhaps, the decision-theoretic model has remained a popular modeling choice for
evidentiary burdens among lay people and practitioners, garnering numerous adherents among
law and economics scholars in the process.
And yet, for all its intuitive appeal, the decision-theoretic framework also suffers from a
number of potentially worrisome shortcomings that ultimately limit its utility as a tool for
economic analysis. First, the decision theoretic approach gives no guidance to the fact-finder
about the appropriate “prior” beliefs to adopt at the onset of litigation, and how to update such
prior beliefs with evidence. It is well known in probability theory that “improper” prior beliefs

22

Much in this discussion turns on the “compared to what” question—specifically, how one portrays the alternative
to an every-element test. Another plausible candidate might be a “sliding scale” standard, where the plaintiff can
prevail if she proves only a subset of the substantive elements according to the standard of proof (or is allowed to
prove some subset according to a discounted standard). It is readily shown that the sliding-scale test as described
here is indeed more plaintiff-friendly than the every-element test. Nevertheless, as this discussion suggests, the
decision-theoretic frame helps to isolate important (and possibly confounding) intuitions in the debate.
23
For example, while Kaplan (1968) and others use a decision-theoretic framework as a means of “gaining insights
into our factfinding processes,” (id. at 1091), both Polinsky & Shavell (2000) and P’ng (1986) employ a decisiontheoretic framework as a backdrop to analyzing the optimal design of substantive legal rules in the presence of
jurisprudential errors. Both Polinsky & Shavell (2000) and P’ng (1986) provide a normative argument for equal
weighting of false negatives and false positives, in the case of zero litigation costs and risk neutral parties. The
game-theoretic literature discussed below retrains focus on how evidentiary standards affect litigation costs.
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can be unreliable guideposts for statistical inference and Bayesian learning.24 Leaving this as an
“open parameter” to be filled in by the fact finder may be a recipe for practical disaster. Many
who apply a decision theoretic frame tend to neglect this issue even as they implicitly make
assumptions about its size.25
Second, even if a sophisticated decision maker had access to informed priors on available
evidence and justiciable conduct, the decision-theoretic model provides an unsatisfactory
account of how the evidence (x) makes its way to the fact-finder. To the contrary, evidence falls
from the metaphorical sky, like manna (or at least manila file folders) from heaven. The process
by which each side uses, produces, authenticates, cross-examines, or rebuts evidence is
substantially black-boxed within this approach (or at least kept offstage). Such a modeling choice
has obvious problems for those interested in positive theory, since the framework delivers few
predictions about how litigants are likely to behave (and at what economic cost), or how that
behavior might change if one (say) inverted the underlying burdens or changed requisite
standard. Moreover, the strategic means by which parties search for and present evidence in
practice almost certainly implies that the fact-finder will observe a biased draw of evidence from
the proverbial Bayesian evidence urn – a factor generally suppressed for in the decision-theoretic
frame (cf. Daughety & Reinganum (2000)). As a result, despite its intuitive allure, the decision24

A classic puzzle/paradox in Bayseian reasoning, originally attributed to Kraitchik (1953), provides an entertaining
example of this problem. You and an “opponent” are each allocated (at random) one of two sealed envelopes that
contain monetary prizes. You are both told nothing about the magnitudes of the prizes in the two envelopes, other
than the fact that one prize is twice as large as the other. You open your envelope, revealing M dollars. You reason
that your counterpart’s envelope is equally likely to have either 2M or ½M dollars in it, and accordingly you
compute the expected value of her envelope to be 1.25M = ½ (2M + ½M). Sensing a profit opportunity, you coyly
ask your opponent if she wishes to trade envelopes. To your surprise, she has been doing exactly the same
calculation, and she eagerly agrees. The reasoning described above presents a paradox, because neither contestant
has any information about whether her envelope contains the most, and they both know that exchanging envelopes is
zero sum game; yet each of them appears to have a strict preference for switching. The paradox occurs because the
reasoning of both players (described above) depends erroneously on the Bayesian updating of an “improper” prior
distribution on (0,∞). For a longer explanation of the paradox and its resolution, see Christensen & Utts (1992).
25
For example, Kaplan’s (1968) seminal paper utilizing the decision theoretic approach recognizes the criticality of
specifying prior beliefs, but offers little in the way providing guidance other than to suggest that they should be
somewhere between ½ and 1 in 200 million.
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theoretic framework is poorly equipped to analyze how evidentiary burdens operate through
litigation, since the underlying approach is simply not a theory that has much to do with
litigation in the first instance.26
Finally, even putting the foregoing objections aside, the decision-theoretic framework
provides only limited traction about how one should weigh (or even think about) Type 1 and
Type 2 errors in a broader sense. Although there are some notable exceptions,27 judicial errors
frequently appear in decision-theoretic frameworks as unadorned costs whose value is
determined outside the model, with little context or evaluation behind them from an underlying
welfare economics theory. In fact, there is some reason to believe that the decision-theoretic
framework described above is a strange bedfellow with robust economic theories of welfare,
particularly the frequently-made assumption that all Type 1 errors (or Type 2 errors) have equal
intensities within their own categorization ranks. For instance, there is little reason to believe
that the nature and consequences of a false positive when the defendant had “barely” complied
with the negligence standard have the same welfare implications as in situations where the
defendant’s precautions were highly supererogatory.

Consequently, the decision theoretic

approach provides a helpful—but somewhat incomplete—vehicle for making normative
assessments of the burden of proof within law and economics.

26

As an anonymous referee correctly points out, the critique that the decision theoretic model is incomplete may
also be applicable to the other modeling tools below. Indeed, as I discuss in the concluding section infra, the project
of developing a unified, all-inclusive, and tractable model of evidence production and primary behavior is still a
significant challenge to this literature. Accord Kaplow (2012).
27
The most notable of these are Polinsky & Shavell (2000) and P’ng (1986), who embed a decision theoretic
account of litigation in an ex ante model of deterrence. I discuss these papers at greater length in Section 3C, infra.
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2. Game Theoretic Frameworks
More recent contributions have focused on developing alternative frameworks that are
better able to capture the incentives and behavior of litigants (focusing less on the decision
theoretic issues for the fact-finder). One particularly influential framework in the literature
conceives of evidentiary burdens as setting the rules for a non-cooperative litigation game of
“evidence production,” where the litigants, acting simultaneously or sequentially, adduce
(potentially conflicting) evidence with the intent to influence the ultimate judgment of the court.
This literature draws considerable influence from other branches of economics that study
redistributive “contests,” including the literatures on political rent-seeking, lobbying, and
international conflict (e.g., Tullock 1980; Hirschleifer 1991; Skaperdas 1996).
The intuitive idea behind such litigation games is relatively straightforward. Litigation,
under this view, serves as a performative venue where litigants engage in what amounts to a
costly arms race to send signals about the strength of their case to the fact-finder. The more
evidence a litigant can muster, the framework posits, the better his chances of prevailing. While
it may seem wasteful on first blush to design a system that encourages this type of costly
litigiousness, it turns out that such mechanisms can be welfare enhancing so long as the
production of evidence serves as a valuable signal about the merits of the party’s position that are
not already known to the fact-finder. Such a signaling role is possible, in turn, if parties with the
most righteous cases also find it relatively cheaper (on the margin) to add evidence into the
record.
In such situations, a judicial rule that invites costly evidence production as a strategic
maneuver may serve as an effective verification device to separate deserving from non-deserving
parties. Moreover, knowing that such a costly verification device exists – and knowing that their
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costs of participating in it will be lower if they behave lawfully now, the prospective parties may
also be deterred from socially wasteful activity ex ante.
To understand how litigation games play out more concretely, suppose a plaintiff (π) and
defendant (Δ) were contemplating litigating an issue (which could pertain to either civil or
criminal liability).

Should litigation occur, the outcome will be a function of underlying

procedural rules, the evidence produced by each side, and possibly a set of external factors.
Accordingly, let the ultimate judgment (or “judgment function”) be denoted as J(x,y,z) where the
arguments

∈

and

∈

denote measures of evidence presented by the plaintiff and the

defendant (respectively). The argument

∈

denotes a vector of other extraneous state-

contingent considerations that are readily observable to the court, and that may (depending on
policy and design decisions) be relevant to the judgment. (These arguments may conceivably be
vector values, as may the judgment function itself28).
Embedded within the judgment function is a host of potential practical considerations in
litigation, including substantive legal rules, policy considerations, and (significantly) BoP
protocols for weighing the evidentiary productions of the parties. Consequently, contributions
within this literature diverge considerably with respect to the key ingredients of the judgment
function. However, virtually all of these approaches commonly posit (with little loss of
generality) that Jx > 0 and Jy < 0, so that larger amounts of evidence produced by the plaintiff
generally enhance the judgment, while larger amounts of evidence produced by the defendant

28

The judgment function may be vector valued for a number of reasons. For example, in many situations, the
judgment may involve more than a mere transfer from the defendant to the plaintiff. For example, a criminal
prosecution might result in both a monetary sanction and a non-monetary punishment. Another example is a civil
case in which damages paid by the defendant are “decoupled” from those received by the plaintiff, with part of the
damages going to the state. See Che & Polinsky (1991); Choi & Sanchirico (2004). Nevertheless, to keep things
simple, I will constrain the discussion to scalar-valued terms.
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dampen it.

(See, e.g., Daughety & Reinganum (2000) Bernardo et al. (2000), and Sanchirico

(2008) for general discussions).

Formal Analysis
Consider, for example, a slight generalization of the litigation contest studied in Bernardo
et al. (2000), who identify J with a function that assigns a liability probability to a case with
, ,

known damages D, so that expected liability is given by
, ,

∙

,

∙

where:
(5)

The term b(z)>0 represents the (possibly state-contingent) “weight” that the defendant’s
evidentiary showing is accorded relative to the plaintiff’s – what Bernardo et al. (2000) analogize
to the strength of an initial assumption / presumption.
Note that this framework presumes that any state-contingent considerations reflected in z
must be fully observable by the court, reflecting any number of general policy commitments.
There may also be a host of other considerations that are relevant, yet not directly observable to
the court. Most saliently, judicial actors are likely to be unable to observe the level of care
undertaken by the defendant. To reflect the distinction between easily observable facts and
opaque ones, suppose the “complete” state of the world is denoted by Ω which can be partitioned
into Ω ≡ Z, W , corresponding to components that are observable and non-observable to the
court, respectively. A key feature in evidence production games (not present in the decisiontheoretic framework) is that the parties’ strategic choices about how much evidence to produce is
that such evidence can provide signals about the unobservable aspects of Ω (as discussed in
greater detail below).29
29

See Sanchirico (2000 & 2001) for general discussions.
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Evidence production models typically assume that evidence production is costly to both
parties. Denote the cost to the plaintiff and defendant, respectively, as cπ(x and c(y,),
,

where

∆

∈ Ω . Significantly, note that the cost of providing evidence for each party is

allowed to turn both on publicly observable information as well as private information of the
parties. While this assumption introduces some complexity, it is often a critically important
ingredient of the evidence production contest approach. In particular, if parties with different
information (say, about their prior negligence) face differential costs of providing evidence, their
performative behavior in court may signal credible evidence about that information—and in so
doing allow the judgment function to provide a mechanism to screen (at least partially) for
liability.
To see more concretely how this screening mechanism might work, suppose that the
parties are risk neutral, that the judgment function is given as in (5) above, fixing b(z) = 2, and
that damages (conditional on liability) are fixed by substantive law at $100. Suppose further that
the plaintiff and the defendant submit their evidence to the court simultaneously, and that the
plaintiff faces a linear cost of evidence production given by cπ(x,) = x. The defendant’s cost
of evidence, in contrast, turns on whether she had previously acted negligently, and in particular
assume that cΔ(y,Negligent)=2y and cΔ(y,Not Negligent)=y.

Finally, suppose that only the

defendant knows with certainty whether she has previously behaved negligently, and that is
common knowledge that negligent and non-negligent defendants are equally prevalent.
It is easily verified in this setting that the equilibrium levels of evidence production
consists of x=23.789 by the plaintiff, yN=12.492 by the negligent defendant, and yNN=22.594 by
the non-negligent defendant.

Note that in equilibrium, the non-negligent defendant brings

substantially more evidence into court than her negligent counterpart, since it is relatively cheap
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for her to adduce evidence in her favor. Consequently, the equilibrium probability of liability
that ensues is approximately 49% for the negligent defendant and 22% for the non-negligent
defendant. That is, the court delivers a harsher expected penalty to the negligent defendant than
it does to the non-negligent one. This is significant for anyone interested in linking the role of
evidence production to ex ante incentives for primary behavior (taken up in Section 4 below).
Discussion
An obvious advantage of the game theoretic approach is that the former explicitly
provides a representation of the process by which litigants bring evidence into the courtroom.
Consequently, it facilitates a number of insights into how their efforts and ultimate outcomes are
affected by altering legal processes (through distortions to the judgment function). Moreover, the
game-theoretic account allows one to analyze more completely the relationship between postinjury litigation activity and pre-injury deterrence. This richer account of litigation has some
clear advantages over the decision-theoretic framework, where such litigation/deterrence
tradeoffs are largely (though not completely) suppressed. For example, as Bernardo et al (2000)
and Sanchirico (2000; 2001) both demonstrate, the signaling/screening advantages of a litigation
contest come at the cost of inducing significant evidence production costs by the parties. In
some circumstances, these litigation inefficiencies can grow so large as to swamp the beneficial
signaling and deterrence benefits (such as when the difference in evidence production costs of
negligent and non-negligent parties is small). In such situations, it may be optimal to push the
applicable presumption / assumption in the direction of an irrebutability.
At the same time, the evidence production game approach to evidentiary burdens some
distinct drawbacks too. First, the most tractable functional forms for J(.) do not have obvious
correspondences to the various institutional features of the BoP analyzed in Section 2. For
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example, in the judgment function explored above, the term b(z) is effectively a proxy for
burdens, presumptions/assumptions, and standards of proof all rolled into one. While it is
possible to interpret an increased burden, a stronger presumption/assumption, or an enhanced
standard through a change in the b(z) function, they tend not to have effects that are
distinguishable from one another.
Second, while the evidence production approach generally does a much better job than
the decision-theoretic model at capturing the litigants’ incentives and behavior, it does a worse
job at capturing the behavior of the fact-finder. Indeed, in this class of models, the fact-finder is
identified largely as an automaton, technocratically applying a judgment function. This
representation can present some obvious difficulties, particularly if one concedes that the factfinder may be a strategic participant in the game. For example, in the evidence production game
analyzed above, evidence production decisions generated a “separating” equilibrium, where
negligent defendants presented a relatively “low” amount of evidence when compared to nonnegligent defendants. As a result, the posited judgment function assigned a greater equilibrium
likelihood of liability to negligent defendants than to non-negligent ones. But it still committed
errors—negligent defendants were exonerated 51% of the time, and non-negligent defendants
were erroneously held liable 22% of the time. Were this judgment function applied by a
sophisticated, Bayesian judge/jury, it would almost certainly understand the separating nature of
the equilibrium. In turn, the fact-finder would plausibly be tempted to abandon the posited
judgment function, and instead assign liability if and only if the defendant had produced a “low”
amount of information according the separating equilibrium. Anticipating that the fact-finder
might change the rules, of course, the litigants themselves might change their own behavior,
potentially upsetting the separating nature of the equilibrium. The basic setup in the evidence
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production framework (as presented above) does not easily allow for such strategic interplay
between the litigants and a sophisticated fact-finder.
Finally, as with the decision-theoretic approach, the continued necessity of committing to
an express functional form for the judgment function may prove to be unduly restrictive for those
interested in purely normative contributions, such as the optimal design of a system of procedure
from the ground up. To be sure, one could still use this approach to formulate modest normative
prescriptions within (say) a particular family of forms. While such an approach may work well
for pragmatically grounded normative inquiries, the limited domain of the resulting prescriptions
would not be particularly attractive in a more purely normative analysis.

3. Hybrids: Game Theoretic Frameworks with a Bayesian Fact-Finder
One potential approach for dealing with at least some of the objections noted above is to
re-introduce the fact-finder as a strategic player who behaves in a sequentially rational fashion.
Such a setup tends to resemble the general setup from the last subsection, but it imposes an
additional “commitment” constraint on the fact finder, ruling out at least certain judgment
functions that would require her to make sub-optimal or inaccurate decisions when called upon
to decide the outcome of the case.
For example, consider a similar framework as above, but suppose the fact-finder were a
Bayesian motivated by judicial accuracy, and was sufficiently sophisticated to “decode”
equilibrium play among the parties.

Such a fact finder would by definition respond to a

completely separating equilibrium by assigning liability to the defendant if and only if the
equilibrium reveals her to be negligent. Consider how such a rule would play out in the
framework developed above, where damages are fixed at $100, plaintiffs and non-negligent
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defendants have marginal evidence production costs of $1, and negligent defendants face
marginal evidence production costs of $2.

As demonstrated above, the judgment function

posited in equation (5) would no longer be viable if the fact-finder always inverted the
equilibrium. However, other forms of judgment function may be consistent with the factfinder’s hypothesized commitment to accurate adjudication.

Consider, for example, the

following judgment function:
, ,

1
0

20

85
.

(6)

It can be easily confirmed that this judgment function supports a fully separating Bayesian
perfect equilibrium in which plaintiffs produce evidence of x=20, non-negligent defendants
produce evidence of yNN=85, and negligent defendants produce no evidence at all. Moreover,
such a framework gives rise to liability if, and only if, defendants are negligent, thereby ensuring
that the fact-finder can commit to the decision rule ex post.30
The addition of a commitment constraint for the fact-finder provides an intuitive way to
combine the decision-theoretic and evidence production models. In fact, the example above
even lends itself to an interpretation of the burdens of persuasion and presumption. (That is, the
plaintiff’s initial burden of production is satisfied by producing at least 20 units of evidence, at
which point the burden of production switches to the defendant, who can rebut it by producing
85 units of evidence).
Nevertheless, it is important to note the limitations of this approach. First, by definition,
the imposition of a commitment condition narrows the range of judgment functions that are
available to implement. This can have real welfare costs: As is well known in the principal/agent
30

This does not imply, of course that the judgment function posited in the text is optimal, and there exist others that
are less costly to implement but equally informative. (Indeed, the function is not even particularly robust to various
equilibrium refinements common to the signaling literature). That said, the example in the previous section was not
assumed to be optimal either.
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optimal contracting literature, good incentive devices tend to reveal information that the
principal would ideally wish later to exploit, but her obvious temptation to do so necessarily
would distort the very behavior that revealed that information in the first instance. Here too,
non-commitment by the fact-finder necessarily limits the types of institutional procedures that
are possible, and as a result the set of achievable outcomes is reduced (possibly in a welfare
reducing way). One interesting and provocative implication of this observation is that a “good”
system of evidence from a welfare perspective may be one that utilizes relatively “dumb” (or at
least non-reflective) fact-finding processes—which are neither designed nor function to make
nuanced assessments of truth, but are instead gauged to incentivize behavior, distribute risk, and
affect other allocative consequences between defendants, plaintiffs, and broader society.
To the extent this last observation is valid, it may raise difficult questions about how (and
even why) the commitment issue comes about in the first place. If the fact-finder were truly
motivated by welfare concerns, then the fact that she may wish to commit to making
classification errors in the process should not itself be objectionable, so long as the system she is
applying induces optimal behavior. Hence, perhaps the best motivation for this approach is to
assume that the fact-finder may also be an agent, and may therefore be motivated by factors that
are either extraneous to social welfare or enter differently in social welfare calculus (such as
accuracy per se, minimizing workload, and so forth). This possibility is taken up below.
Finally, just as with the evidence production approaches with commitment, the simple
addition of a commitment constraint does not ensure that the class of judgment function being
studied is sufficiently broad to satisfy purely normative scholars interested in “optimal” process
design.

To engage in this enterprise requires a more general approach, less wedded to a

particular class of processes or functional forms. It is to this last literature I now turn.
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4. Mechanism Design Approaches
A final significant strand in the BoP literature endeavors to engage more directly in broad
institutional design. That is, rather than focusing on a particular set of functional forms for
designing legal procedure, the mechanism design (MD) approach endeavors to derive the
characteristics of an “optimal” set of fact-finding processes BoP from a set of first principles
about social objectives, individual incentives, and information constraints. This approach can
yield powerful insights useful to those interested in normative analysis and is increasingly
popular. (See, Sobel 1985; Shin 1998; Sanchirico 1995, 2000, 2001; Bull & Watson 2004;
Demougin & Fluet. 2006. Cf. Cooter & Emons 2004).
The kernel of the MD approach focuses on structuring legal process from the “ground
up”, but with consistent attention to how design choices alter and affect the incentives of the
parties both (a) to participate in the process; and (b) to “play by the rules” – i.e., reveal truthful
information to the fact-finder – when litigation occurs. These two key design constraints are
sometimes referred to (respectively) as the parties’ “Individual Rationality” and “Incentive
Compatibility” conditions.

Unlike the game-theoretic approach described above, the MD

approach does not commit to a particular judgment function. Rather, it endeavors to derive an
“optimal” one in the sense of maximizing economic welfare according to any possible set of
institutional rules, but without violating to the two aforementioned types of constraints.
A handy tool that many MD approaches employ is to concentrate on (so-called) “direct
revelation mechanisms,” which are processes where the litigants are simply asked to report to the
fact-finder all of relevant information they privately know about the case (e.g., their extent of
precautions, level of risk preferences, extent of damage, etc.), and the fact-finder delivers a
binding judgment and instructed behavior based on those reports. While there is nothing (in
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principle) that would prevent the litigants from attempting to deceive the fact-finder when
making their reports to the fact-finder, the “trick” of the MD approach is to design a set of
decision functions that anticipate these incentives, account for them, and alter payoffs to make
truth-telling optimal for all parties.31
More formally, and utilizing the notation from the previous sections, under the MD
,

approach the parties are asked to report their own private information

∆

to the fact finder.

Recall that this information is not directly verifiable to the mechanism designer, and thus nothing
,

necessarily precludes misrepresentation by the parties. Thus, let

∆

denote the actual

reports (truthful or not) submitted by the parties to the court. Once the parties have submitted
,

∆

, the mechanism announces (i) quantities of evidence that the parties are required to
,

produce based on their reports (
,

expected final judgment

∆;

∆;

,

, and

∆;

, respectively), along with (ii) an

, which the defendant damages to the plaintiff.32 Together,

these three decisions constitute the decision mechanism of the fact finder, collectively denoted as
Γ

,

∆|

. As before, assume that the cost to the plaintiff and defendant of producing these

levels of evidence are c(x,) and c(y,), respectively.
Using this notation, any adjudication mechanism that induces both truth-telling and
participation by both the plaintiff and defendant must satisfy the following four conditions:
∈

(ICπ):
(ICΔ):
(IRπ):

∆

∆

∈

∆

,
,

∆

,

∆;

∆;

,
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,

∆;
∆;

,

∆

,

∆;
∆;

,

(7)
,

∆

0

The ability to limit one’s attention solely to mechanisms that induce truth-telling in equilibrium is sometimes
referred to as the “revelation principle.” It is generally applicable in most litigation settings, but perhaps not
universally so.
32
.The actual judgment may be stochastic, and can reflect both liability and damages assessments.
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(IRΔ):

,

∆

∆;

,

∆

∆;

,

Conditions (ICπ) and (ICΔ), the “incentive compatibility” constraints, essentially require
that truthful disclosure is a Nash equilibrium under the posited mechanism (assuming that
truthful disclosure is a normative goal). Conditions (IRπ) and (IRΔ) the individual rationality
constraints, requires that it be rational for the plaintiff and defendant to participate in the game.
Thus, Condition (IRπ) requires that the plaintiff’s expected payoff in equilibrium be no lower
than simply choosing not to litigate (and received payoff of zero). A similar interpretation
applies to (IR), which requires that the defendant’s expected payoff be no lower than what he
would expect to pay in a default judgment. 33
Finally, and common with the analysis of the previous section, a direct revelation
mechanism may permit the fact-finder to learn private information from the litigants. If the factfinder herself is unable to commit to any type of judgment mechanism, then there may be
another constraint on the set of admissible mechanisms in light of what the fact-finder is able to
commit to given her own preferences (e.g., truth-seeking, effort minimizing, etc.). Denoting the
set of mechanisms to which a fully-informed fact-finder could commit as (,), this would
suggest a fifth constraint on the design problem:
(CFF):

Γ

,

∆|

⊆ Γ∗

,

(8)

∆

As should be clear by this point (perhaps painfully so), the MD approach is easily the
most abstract and technically demanding framework discussed in this chapter.

Moreover,

33

Condition (IRΔ) is not a mirror image of Conditions (IRπ) because the defendant does not voluntarily
appear in court. Instead, (IRΔ) simply places an upper limit (K) on the damages the defendant can lose in
a default judgment, which in civil cases is plausibly the defendant’s bankruptcy threshold. When the
defendant is well capitalized, (IRΔ) need not constitute a binding constraint.In criminal cases, in contrast, the
situation is frequently a bit more complicated, since the judgment might accord non-zero-sum payoffs to the
prosecutor and defendant.
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characterizing the solution to an MD problem is also a technical and intricate enterprise, and
therefore it is beyond the scope of the current inquiry.
Nevertheless, the mechanism design approach can be a powerful tool, particularly for
normative analysis of the BoP. An “optimal” mechanism generally represents the best possible
outcome that one could hope to achieve in a non-cooperative setting.

Consequently, its

characteristics represent an enormously useful benchmark for comparing, assessing, and
rationalizing current institutional practices. Moreover, the MD approach can sometimes deliver
helpful suggestions about what should or should not matter in designing a “better” evidentiary
system.
Yet the strengths of the MD framework are also its limitations. Since it is focused on
deriving optimal rules, it is not particularly effective at analyzing the economic effects of
existing BoP institutions. More to the point, mechanism design approaches generally do not
produce a complete description of processes by which their outcomes can be achieved. They
merely characterize what sorts of outcomes are possible under ideal circumstances.
Consequently, even if one were confident about the desirability of an optimal mechanism, it
might be very difficult in practice to build a set of institutions capable of generating those
outcomes.
Second, even the normative application of the mechanism design approach requires one
to articulate exactly what the appropriate welfare function is. There are a number of factors that
may go into that decision, and ultimately this is a dimension on which many existing
contributions to the literature (both within the mechanism design tradition and outside it) tend to
diverge. It is to this last substantive distinction I now turn.
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C. Scope of Inquiry: Ex Ante, Litigation, or Both?
Perhaps one of the most substantial (and in some ways vexing) challenges to normative
applications of law and economics to the BoP is that of articulating what, precisely, the
appropriate social welfare goal (or goals) should be. While most economists tend to embrace
welfare measures that correspond (roughly) with various measures of efficiency, the appropriate
domain of an efficiency measure is itself somewhat elusive within this literature.
Part of the reason for this elusiveness stems from the traditional distinction that the law
(and many legal scholars) have placed on procedural versus substantive rules. One way to
appreciate this distinct (at least heuristically) appears in Figure 1:

Figure 1: Elements of Welfare and Substance vs. Process

The figure represents five relevant economic considerations for the function of law: (A)
Transaction/Bargaining costs; (B) Investment, Reliance and/or Precaution Costs, (C) Incidence /
Likelihood of Harm; (D) Adjudication / Litigation costs; and (E) Sanctions and Enforcement
Activity. Although these categories are almost certainly not exclusive, they are all clearly
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relevant for economic analysis, and are intuitive components of virtually any economic welfare
measure. (For example, a standard Calabresian efficiency analysis might ask what sets of
substantive and procedural rules would tend to minimize the total expected costs from each of
the five categorical dimensions illustrated in the figure).
At the risk of simplification, it is largely accurate to state that economic analysis of most
substantive legal rules—such as liability or negligence standards, remedies, affirmative defenses,
and the like have typically focused on how such rules affect the activities in categories (A), (B),
and (C). And, at the same time, most economic analysis of the legal process—such as pleading
standards, filing fees, and, notably, burdens of proof—tends to fall most naturally into steps (D)
and (E). In other words, at least initial scholarship on burdens of proof largely concentrated on
how they affected the incidence and distribution of costs in litigation, as well as the cost and
accuracy of trial outcomes.
This characterization, of course, is also somewhat of a gross over-simplification. Even
moderately well-read legal scholars will recognize immediately that most claims about the
distinction between form and process have serious conceptual problems. Procedural rules, they
will assert, can profoundly (even if indirectly) affect deterrence, proof, and available remedies,
and vice versa. Indeed, plausibly since the very introduction of the Substance/Process distinction
(largely thought to have come from Blackstone), legal commentators have expressed frustration
at it, describing it in turns as “vague,” “imprecise,” “chameleon-like,” and “superbly fuzzy”
(Main 2010).
Nevertheless, the distinction is one that to this day animates legal practice, and the
trajectory of economic analysis of legal burdens has largely followed a similar course. Early
contributions in this literature tended to focus predominantly on welfare measures that pertained
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solely to litigation and beyond. Within this domain, a number of considerations are at the
forefront, such as how the BoP interacts with expended litigation costs, delay costs, judicial
accuracy, and the likelihood / terms of settlement. (Rubinfeld & Sappington 1987; Easterbrook
1984).
More recently, however, law and economics scholars have begun to deliver insights into
how elements of litigation (including burdens) are likely to have feedback effects on primary
behavior of plaintiffs and defendants—the subject matter that is most closely associated with
substantive law (rather than procedural rules).

One set of important contributions to the

literature (most notably, Polinsky & Shavell (2000), and P’ng (1986)) study a decision-theoretic
model of adjudication in a standard deterrence framework to analyze the effects of judicial error.
Within this framework, judicial errors tend to dilute deterrence incentives, reducing prospective
liability risk from bad behavior and increasing risk from good behavior. Consequently, it is
generally welfare improving to attempt to reduce the incidence of error.

Perhaps more

interesting is the observation that under a number of relatively general conditions, the efficiency
costs of false positives and false negatives are symmetric, giving some justification to a
preponderance standard (which equally weighs Type 1 and Type 2 errors).
Another cluster of papers in law and economics beginning soon began to push that
analytic step a notch further, explicitly studying how strategic behavior during litigation interacts
with primary activities. (See, e.g., Sanchirico 1995; 2008; Bernardo et al. 2000; Demougian &
Fluet 2006). These papers tend to tie game theoretic or mechanism design frameworks to models
of deterrence. This is an area that has been particularly fertile during the last decade or so. By
way of example, Bernardo et al (2000) develop a game-theoretic model of evidence production
that explicitly links ex ante deterrence and the standard of proof at trial. Using this model, they
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illustrate how pro-defendant reforms can have two countervailing effects. First, the hypothesized
reform makes it less likely (all else constant) for plaintiffs to prevail in trial and thus less
attractive for them to litigate; but second, defendants have an incentive to engage in fewer
precautions ex ante, because of the protection the procedural reform affords them. In fact,
Bernardo et al (2000) demonstrate that this second effect can easily be the dominant one – so that
following a defendant-friendly procedural reform, one would predict an increase in the number
of lawsuits filed as well as an increase in plaintiffs’ overall win rate.
Sanchirico (2008) provides a cogent analysis of burdens of persuasion and production in
a plausible game-theoretic framework linking ex ante litigation to strategic evidence production
in trial. He offers an insightful justification for the possibly curious practice of usually placing
the burden of persuasion (and initial production) on the party who is not the target of the law’s
deterrence efforts (e.g., the injured plaintiff and not the defendant). Specifically, his model
posits that the exercise of due care ex ante by a prospective defendant is likely to have two
effects on later evidence production costs: (a) It will reduce the prospective defendant’s costs of
producing exculpatory evidence should injury occur; and (b) it will increases the plaintiff’s cost
of producing inculpatory evidence. The combined effects of this shift enhance economic welfare
by making it both more likely that an injured plaintiff will file suit only against negligent
defendants, and more likely that non-negligent defendants can prevail (cheaply) should the
plaintiff does sue.34
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Although Sanchirico (2008) does not analyze the issue squarely, his framework would also seem useful in
understanding why in some situations tort law places the burden of production on the defendant, such as in
application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Such cases are plausibly typified by plaintiffs whose access to
inculpatory evidence is both highly limited (e.g., they were not conscious) and likely unaffected by the defendant’s
care level. In such situations, the sorting / screening benefits of burdening the plaintiff highlighted by Sanchirico
(2008) tend to diminish substantially, if not completely.
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Other interesting contributions outside the tort setting also link primary activity to
evidence production. Lando (2006), for example, develops a model in which a large number of
wrongful convictions might be efficient if there is high serial correlation across offences.
Bernhardt and Nosal (2004) study the bankruptcy question of which distressed firms to liquidate
or preserve. They demonstrate that even when a reliable technology exists for discerning “high
quality” firms (who would efficiently be bailed out), it may make sense to eschew such
technologies since the knowledge of a future bailout would induce high quality firms to take
excessive risk ex ante.

Demougin & Fluet (2006; 2008) work within a mechanism design

framework, demonstrating within a special setting (where costs of producing evidence are of
second order importance) that a preponderance standard can implement the allocation of an
optimal mechanism.

4. Moving Forward
Although the theoretical literature on the BoP is now quite mature, it is in many ways still
in a conceptual growth spurt. There are at least four challenges for this literature going forward.
The first challenge is categorical. As noted above, most contributions within the field tend to fall
into one of four modeling classifications: decision-theoretic; game-theoretic; hybrid; and
mechanism design.

Each of them generates particular and helpful insights about how to

understand and design evidentiary procedures. However, until recently, there has been little
work to synthesize them. (This chapter and contemporaneous and important work by Kaplow
(2011; 2012) may go some distance to address this issue).

It is likely that mechanism design

frameworks have the most promise for making the literature more parsimonious, but (as noted
above) this approach faces significant challenges to implementation. A significant amount of

38

theoretical work has yet to be done on deriving extensive form implementations of optimal
mechanisms within familiar procedural environments.

Moreover, although behavioral

economics and prospect theory have penetrated this area of L&E just as elsewhere, there are
likely many more opportunities for theoretically minded scholars to develop models of burdens
incorporating prospect theory, anchoring effects, and bounded rationality.
The second issue is empirical. Particularly when one considers how the BoP interacts
with primary activities and deterrence, the strategic dynamics quickly become complex,
depending critically on deeply embedded modeling parameters. Consequently, it is difficult to
know what to make of the growing theoretical literature in the absence of high quality
experimental and empirical work to help calibrate the underlying theoretical models. That work
is only just beginning, but is decidedly underway.35
The final issue is pragmatic and political. Particularly for those interested in normative
prescriptions that emanate from this literature, it is now relatively clear that within a number of
realistic factual settings, an “optimal” burden of proof likely diverges (perhaps wildly) from the
familiar legal procedures that have been part and parcel of legal practice for decades if not
centuries. In such cases, it seems highly implausible that legal institutions are likely to embrace
reform proposals with open arms. Perhaps a much better tack for those interested in normative
prescriptions is to advocate the use of non-standard burdens in arbitration proceedings, where
judicial processes are more of a matter of contract (Hadfield & Talley 2006). Not only would
such applications constitute a ready market for new innovations, but they would also possibly act
as important field experiments for them.
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See, e.g., Zamir & Ritov (2012) who present an intriguing set of experiments that suggest omission and status quo
biases may alter representative jurors’ proof requirements in a preponderance case to be well over 50%.

39

References

Allen, Ronald J. (1981). Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, Iowa L. Rev. 66: 843-67.
Baum, Ido, Eberhard Feess & Ansgar Wohlschlegel (2009), Reporter's Privilege and Incentives
to Leak, REVIEW OF LAW & ECONONOMICS, 5, 701–15.
Bernardo, Antonio, Eric Talley & Ivo Welch (2000), A Theory of Legal Presumptions, JOURNAL
OF LAW, ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, 16, 1–49.
Bernardo, Antonio & Eric L. Talley (1999), A Note on Presumptions with Sequential Litigation
University of Southern California Law School, Olin Working Paper No. 99-9.
Bull, Jesse & Joel Watson (2004), Evidence Disclosure and Verifiability, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC
THEORY, 118, 1–31.
Burnhardt, Dan & Ed Nodal, (2004), Near-Sighted Justice, JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 6, 2655–84.
Che, Yeon-Koo & A. Mitchell Polinsky (1991), Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for
Care and Litigation, Rand J. Econ. 22(4): 562-70.
Choi, Albert & C. Sanchirico (2004), Should Plaintiffs Win What Defendants Lose? Litigation
Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of Decoupling, JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES,
33, 323–54.
Cooter, Robert. & W. Emons (2003), Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts, JOURNAL
INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 159, 259–79.

OF

Christensen, Ronald & Jessica Utts (1992), Bayesian Resolution of the ‘Exchange Paradox’,
THE AMERICAN STATISTICIAN, 46, 274–76.
Daughety, Andrew & Jennifer Reinganum (2000), On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial
Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias, JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS &
ORGANIZATION, 16, 365–94.
Demougin, Dominique & Claude Fluet (2006), Preponderance of Evidence, EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC REVIEW, 50, 963–76.
Demougin, Dominique & Claude Fluet (2008), Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives, RAND
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 39, 20–40.
Dewatripont, Mathias & Jean Tirole (1999), Advocates, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 107,
1–39.
Easterbrook, Frank H. (1984), The Limits of Antitrust, TEXAS LAW REVIEW, 63, 1–40.

40

Fees, Eberhard, Gert Muehlheusser & Ansgar Wohlschlegel (2009), Environmental Liability
Under Uncertain Causation, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 28, 133–48.
Hadfield, Gillian K. & Eric Talley (2006), On Public versus Private Provision of Corporate
Law, J. LAW ECON. & ORG. 14: 137-63.
Hirshleifer, Jack (1991), The Paradox of Power, ECONOMICS & POLITICS, 3, 177–200.
Hylton, Keith N. & Salinger, M. (2001), Tying Law and Policy: A Decision Theoretic Approach,
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL, 69, 469–526.
In re Winship 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Kaplan, John (1968), Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, STAN. L. REV. 20:1065-92.
Kaplow, Louis (1994), The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, JOURNAL
OF LEGAL STUDIES, 23, 307–401.
Kaplow, Louis (2011). “Optimal Proof Burdens, Deterrence, and the Chilling of Desirable
Behavior,” Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 101:277-80.
Kaplow, Louis (2012), Burden of Proof, YALE LAW JOURNAL 121 Yale L.J. 738-859.
Katsoulacos, Yannis S. (2008), Optimal Legal Standards for Refusals To License Intellectual
Property: A Welfare-Based Analysis, JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS, 5,
269–95.
Katsoulacos, Yannis & David Ulphz (2009), On Optimal Legal Standards for Competition
Policy: A General Welfare-Based Analysis, JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 57,
410–37.
Kraitchit, Maurice (1953), MATHEMATICAL RECREATIONS (New York: Dover Publications, 2nd
ed.).
Lando, H. (2006), Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?, JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES,
35, 327–37.
Main, Thomas (2010), The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, WASH. U. LAW REV.
87:801-41.
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
Milgrom, P. & Roberts, J. (1986), Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, RAND
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 17, 18–32.
Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Steven Shavell (2000). The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of
Law, J. Econ. Lit. 38: 45-76.

41

Posner, Richard (1999), An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, STANFORD LAW
REVIEW, 51, 1477–1546.
Png, Ivan P. L. (1986). Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial Error Int’l
Rev. L. & Econ. 6: 101-5.
Rubinfeld, Daniel & David Sappington (1987), Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in
Judicial Proceedings, RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 18, 308–15.
Sanchirico, Chris William, “Enforcement by Hearing: How the Civil Law Sets Incentives,”
Columbia Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 9596-03 (1995).
Sanchirico, Chris William (1997), The Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation: A Simple Model of
Mechanism Design, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 17, 431–47.
Sanchirico, Chris William (2000), Games, Information and Evidence Production: With
Application to English Legal History, AM. L. & ECON. REV. 2:342-80.
Sanchirico, Chris William (2001), Relying on the Information of Interested--and Potentially
Dishonest--Parties, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 320-57.
Sanchirico, Chris William (2008), A Primary Activity Approach to Proof Burdens, J. LEGAL
STUD. 37: 273-313.
Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
Shin, H.S. (1998), Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures In Arbitration, RAND J. OF ECON.
29: 378–405.
Skaperdas, Stergios (1996), Contest Success Functions, ECONOMIC THEORY, 7, 283–90.
Sobel, Joel (1985), Disclosure of Evidence and Resolution of Disputes: Who Should Bear the
Burden of Proof?, in Alvin E. Roth, ed., GAME THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAINING
(New York: Cambridge University Press).
Stein, Alex (2005), THE FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW (Oxford University Press).
Strong, John William (1999), MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §342 (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 5th
ed.).
Tullock, Gordon (1980), Efficient Rent Seeking, in J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison & G. Tullock,
eds., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (College Station: Texas A&M
University Press).
Wigmore, John H. (1940), Wigmore on Evidence, (3d ed.).
Winter, Ralph, (1971), The Jury and the Risk of Non-Persuasion, Law & Society Rev. 5: 335-44.

42

Wright, Charles A., Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Victor James Gold, Michael H. Graham (2012),
21B Federal Practice & Procedure (2nd Ed.).
Zamir, Eyal & Ilana Ritov (2012), Loss Aversion, Omission Bias, and the Burden of Proof in
Civil Litigation, J. LEGAL STUD., 41(1) 165-207.

43

